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RECENT CASE NOTES
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-ENJOINING

SUITS IN ANOTHER STATE-Joseph

Crandall, an employee of defendant railroad and an inhabitant of Vanderburgh county, Indiana, was killed while engaged in interstate commerce.
His widow was appointed administratrix by the probate court of Vanderburgh county, and she filed suit against the railroad in Missouri under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act to recover damages for the death of
her husband. Upon petition of the railroad the probate court of Vanderburgh county enjoined the administratrix from directly or indirectly prosecuting the Missouri suit. Thereupon the widow dismissed the Missouri
suit, but had her attorney appointed administrator in Missouri, and he
filed a similar action there. The administratrix was then adjudged in contempt by the probate court of Vanderburgh county, and was fined and imprisoned. At this point she secured a writ of habeas corpus from the Federal District Court. Upon a motion to quash the writ, Held, writ dismissed
and petitioner remanded to the custody of the sheriff. Ex parte Crandall.
District Court, S. D. Indiana, Evansville Division, 52 Fed. (2d) 650.
Because of the Missouri law permitting a verdict by nine of twelve
jurors, and the Minnesota law permitting a verdict by ten of the twelve
jurors, the courts of these states have become popular for damage suits
against railroads. Consequently railroad companies are often harassed
by being forced to defend suits far from the scene of the accident, and far
from the residence of the parties and their witnesses, and they frequently
resort to injunctions restraining the prosecution of the suits in the above
states.
The rule is well-settled that a court of equity, having jurisdiction over
the party, will, upon a proper showing, enjoin him from prosecuting the
action in the courts of another state. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107;
Sandage v. Studebaker, 41 N. E. 380, 142 Ind. 148; Cleveland, C. C. & St.
L. Ry. Co. v. Shelly, 170 N. E. 328 (Ind. App.). The issuance of such an
injunction is not an attempt to control the actions of the court of another
state, but is a restriction upon the person of one within the jurisdiction of
the court issuing the injunction. Rader v. Stubblefield, 43 Wash. 334,
86 Pac. 560 (Wash.).
It is not disputed that the probate court possesses general equitable
jurisdiction, Burns R. S. 1926, sec. 1762, 1771. However the petitioner
insists that the Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 51-59, gives
her an absolute right to sue in the state courts of Missouri, and that this
right cannot be abridged by a state court of equity. This contention has
been raised before, and the courts have held that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act does not "require state courts to entertain suits arising under
it, but only empowers them to do so," Douglas v. New Haven R. R., 279
U. S. 377, and that it does not confer additional jurisdiction upon state
courts, but that the jurisdiction of state courts remains the same, and that
since the state courts could enjoin the prosecution of actions in a foreign
state before the act, they may still do so. Cleveland, C., C., C. & St.
Louis Ry. Co. v. Shelly, supra; Chicago, M. & St. Paul R. R. v. McGinley,
175 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218; Reed's Adi 'x v. Illinois Central R. R., 182
Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794. But the state courts cannot interfere with the
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exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts. Chicago, M. & St. Paul R. R. V.
Schendel, 292 Fed. 326.
The question of when the courts will exercise such jurisdiction leads
to greater difficulty. All courts will enjoin a foreign suit when its purpose
is to evade the substantive law of the domicile of the plaintiff in such suit;
but most courts refuse an injunction merely because the procedure in the
foreign state is different. Sandage v. Studebaker, supra. The favorite
expression of the courts is that an injunction will issue only to prevent
hardship, fraud, or oppression. Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill.
383, 115 N. E. 554. The court in the McGinley case did not think that
the loss of the privilege of examining the plaintiff before the suit, the subjection of the defendant to the verdict of ten of twelve jurors, the fact
that the jury could not view the scene of the accident, the fact that defendant's witnesses could not be subpoenaed, or the allegation that plaintiff's
attorneys were ambulance chasers warranted an injunction. The court
held in the Prentiss case that an injunction was not justified because
defendant would be subjected to the verdict of nine of twelve jurors. But
the Indiana Court in the Shelly case thought that the verdict of nine of
twelve jurors would give plaintiff an unfair advantage, although the court
also based the issuance of the injunction upon the trouble and expense of
defending a suit in a foreign jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the great distance between the state of Washington, the
residence of plaintiff and defendant, and the state of Minnesota, where the
suit was filed, warranted an injunction against the prosecution of the suit
in Minnesota. Northern Ry. v. Richey and Gilbert Co., 132 Wash. 526, 232
Pac. 355. The allegations that the defense of a suit in a foreign jurisdiction would entail inconvenience and expense, and that the finding of fact
by the jury was not subject to review on appeal were held not to entitle
defendant to an injunction. Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385.
The allegation in Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Central,supra, that the plaintiff's
attorney had been retained because of unethical practice was insufficient
to justify an injunction, but an injunction was granted upon the allegation
that the suit was brought in a foreign state merely for the purpose of
harassing the defendant, and putting him to greater expense. The Indiana
court in Culp v. Butler, 69 Ind. App. 668, 122 N. E. 684, enjoined the plaintiff from prosecuting an action in Illinois when the statute of limitations
had barred the action in Indiana. The decision has been criticized in 33
Harvard L. R. 92, the author of that article being of the opinion that the
decision was erroneous because the plaintiff's cause of action still existed
in Indiana, although his remedy was lost. A suit filed in a foreign jurisdiction may be enjoined because its prosecution would be a burden on
interstate commerce. Michigan Central R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492; Davis
v. Farmer's Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U. S. 312; Weinard v. Chicago,
M. & St. Paul R. R., 298 Fed. 977.
The rule to be deduced from the above authorities is that the courts,
though often reluctant to do so, will issue an injunction if they think the
litigation vexatious. But each court has a somewhat different conception
of vexatiousness. In the principal case the probate court, upon the authority of the Shelly case, properly issued the injunction. And since the
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court acted within its jurisdiction the dismissal of the writ of habeas
corpus by the district court was correct, it being available only when there
is a want of jurisdiction. United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48.
R. 0. E.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC UTILITIES--PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMIssIoN-The city of Logansport has for some thirty years owned and
operated an electric light plant. Said plant was paid for originally with
funds raised by taxation, and was later enlarged and extended in part with
funds raised by taxation, and in part with surplus earnings of the plant.
The Public Service Commission of Indiana ordered a reduction of the city's
rates of charges to the public for electric current. The city brought an
action to enjoin and set aside the operation of said order on the following
grounds, as stated by the four paragraphs of the complaint:
(1) Right
to manage the plant and fix the rates to be charged is vested in the city by
virtue of its inherent power as an independent body politic or by the right
of local self-government, and such rates cannot be controlled by the Legislature or by any commission appointed by it.
(2) The law creating the
Public Service Commission of Indiana does not apply to municipally owned
public utilities, and the commission has no right thereunder to fix the rates
in question. (3) Rates fixed by the commission are inadequate and confiscatory, and are therefore unlawful and unconstitutional since they do
not provide a fair return upon the fair value of the property (that to
which a privately owned utility is entitled), but provide only sufficient
revenue to pay operating and maintenance charges. (4) Rates are insufficient because they do not yield a sum sufficient to compensate the city for
the taxes which the plant would pay if it were privately owned.
The city appealed from a judgment sustaining demurrers to the four
paragraphs of the complaint. Held, judgment reversed, with directions to
overrule the demurrer to the third paragraph only. City of Logansport v.
Public Service Commission, Supreme Court of Indiana, July 1, 1931,
177 N. E. 249.
The decision is beyond criticism. The demurrer to the first paragraph
of the complaint was correctly sustained because municipal corporations
have no inherent right of self-government which is beyond the legislative
control of the state, but are political subdivisions of the state, exercising
delegated powers. City of Tulsa v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 4 Fed.
(2d) 399, 269 U. S. 527; Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U. S. 517, 30 L. Ed.
701; City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., 250 U. S. 394, 63 L.
Ed. 1054. The action of the court on the other demurrers was obviously
correct in view of the statutes hereinafter discussed.
The decision definitely expresses the necessary result of the Public
Service Acts of Indiana. Said acts read as follows: "The term 'public
utility' as used in this act, shall mean and embrace * * * every city
or town that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control
* *
* any plant or equipment within the state * * * for the protection, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat, light * * * or
power * * * either directly or indirectly to or for the public." Burns'
1926, sec. 12672. Plainer language could not be used. Municipal corpora-

